The Model Context Protocol Registry passed 10,000 servers earlier this month. Two thousand seven hundred and three of them link to a public GitHub repository — the rest are remote endpoints (HTTPS-served MCP). I sampled 300 of the GitHub-backed servers at random, scored 202 successfully (the other 98 link to private or missing repos), and looked for patterns.

The pattern is striking: 83% of the servers I scored carry at least one disqualifier flag. Not a soft warning — a hard signal that the project lacks something a trustworthy MCP server should have. Average legitimacy across the sample is 3.05 out of 10.

TL;DR

202Servers scored
1.5%Verified
81%Established
2.5%Blocked

Mean composite: 5.35/10 (vs. 6.17 for ClawHub). Median: 5.38. Range: 2.93–7.64. Fifteen percent of servers landed in the "New" tier — too few signals to evaluate confidently. Zero servers declared a security posture in their MCP server metadata. Zero known CVEs. Zero CISA KEV hits.

Tier Distribution

1.5%
81%
15%
2.5%
Verified (3 servers) Established (164 servers) New (30 servers) Blocked (5 servers)

Three Verified servers in 202. The MCP Registry is a long tail — one verified head, a dense middle of "established but unproven," and a thick layer of new and unproven. The shape is what you'd expect from a fast-growing protocol with a low publishing barrier.

The Disqualifier Iceberg

Only five servers tripped to the Blocked tier — but tier doesn't tell the full story. 168 of 202 servers (83%) carry at least one disqualifier flag. Disqualifiers don't always hard-gate to blocked; they apply soft caps, score penalties, and tier downgrades depending on severity.

SINGLE_AUTHOR_LOW_ADOPTION
One contributor + low community adoption (stars, downloads). Bus factor of one.
11858%
NO_LICENSE
No LICENSE file or unrecognized SPDX identifier. Legally unsafe to use commercially.
4221%
SAFETY_BLOCK
Static analysis flagged dangerous patterns (eval/exec on user input, credential exfiltration, etc.).
52.5%
SUPPLY_CHAIN_RISK
CI workflow checks out PR-target code or echoes secrets. GitHub-actions vector.
31.5%

The two big drivers — single-author (58%) and no license (21%) — are both fixable. Both reflect publishing speed exceeding governance maturity. The MCP server template ships, the developer iterates fast, the LICENSE file gets skipped, the second contributor never lands. Multiply by 10,000 registry entries and you have a structural pattern.

Where the Weakness Lives

Average dimension scores across the full sample (n=202):

Alive 6.22
Legit 3.05
Solid 6.15
Usable 6.50

Legitimacy averages 3.05/10 — not weak, collapsed. This dimension covers author credibility, community adoption, contributor diversity, and download traction. Most MCP Registry entries have one author, dozens of stars or fewer, and no second contributor. The protocol is young; most servers are someone's weekend project; the registry doesn't filter for traction.

The contrast with ClawHub is sharp. ClawHub averaged Legit 7.36 because its top-ranked entries are mature multi-feature applications (cherry-studio, siyuan, casdoor) that ship with skill manifests. MCP Registry is dominated by purpose-built single-server projects, which don't have the community signals built up yet.

Top 10 Most Trusted

ServerScoreTierStars
Azure/containerization-assist7.64Verified40
SonarSource/sonarqube-mcp-server7.39Verified542
ArcadeData/arcadedb7.29Verified830
Dave-London/Pare7.02Established121
JustinBeckwith/linkinator-mcp6.95Established3
JanDeDobbeleer/oh-my-posh6.93Established22,348
ondata/ckan-mcp-server6.90Established42
CodeAlive-AI/codealive-mcp6.88Established78
Maxim-Mazurok/teams-api6.84Established2
Elnora-AI/elnora-mcp-server6.81Established3

The top server has 40 stars. The contrast with ClawHub's top (38,691 stars) is telling. MCP Registry trust isn't dominated by popularity — it's dominated by maintainer discipline. Azure publishes containerization-assist with full LICENSE + governance + multiple contributors + clean CI; popularity hasn't caught up yet, but the trust signal is already there.

The Five Blocked Servers

ServerScoreDisqualifiers
XXO47OXX/spa-reader-mcp4.31SAFETY_BLOCK + SINGLE_AUTHOR_LOW_ADOPTION
ariffazil/arifOS4.55SAFETY_BLOCK
JuanCF/scrcpy-mcp4.82SAFETY_BLOCK
abbacusgroup/Cortex4.84SAFETY_BLOCK
forgesworn/402-mcp5.82SAFETY_BLOCK

All five hit the static-analysis safety scanner. The most common pattern: shell execution on user input from MCP tool arguments, or credential strings appearing in source code paths the scanner can read. None are confirmed malicious — the safety scanner flags patterns, not intent. But the patterns are worth investigating before installing.

The Good News

Zero known CVEs. Zero CISA KEV hits.

The known_vulnerabilities signal cross-referenced 81 servers (those with package.json files in the registry) against OSV.dev, CISA KEV, and FIRST.org EPSS. Result: no unpatched criticals, no actively-exploited vulnerabilities. The MCP ecosystem is young enough that the published-CVE problem hasn't accumulated yet. Catch this gap before it does.

What This Means for You

If you publish MCP servers:
Add a LICENSE file (you'll skip the 21% trap) and pin your CI actions to commit SHAs (you'll skip the 1.5% supply-chain trap). If you can land a second contributor, even for one bug fix, you exit the 58% bus-factor cohort. Three small actions move you above the median.
If you install MCP servers:
Don't lean on registry presence as a trust signal. The MCP Registry catalogs; it does not vet. Of 300 random servers I tried to score, 98 link to repos that are private, deleted, or otherwise unfetchable. Score before you install.
If you operate the MCP Registry:
A required-LICENSE check at publish time would eliminate 21% of disqualifiers overnight. A required contributors.length >= 2 OR stars >= 50 rule would prune the long tail. Neither is a heavy lift; both raise the floor without blocking real publishers.
If you build agent platforms:
Surface the trust score next to the install button. Right now installing an MCP server is a single command with no friction; trust signals are an afterthought. A pre-install score check would do more for ecosystem hygiene than any post-install scanner.

What This Data Doesn't Tell You

Honest limitations: The mcpskills.io engine scores the project around an MCP server — repo health, author signals, security posture, dependency hygiene — not the runtime behavior of the server when an agent invokes its tools. A server could pass static analysis and still leak credentials at runtime, or honor a prompt-injected instruction. Static analysis catches obvious dangerous patterns in source files; it cannot model multi-step tool-call dynamics. Runtime monitoring is on the roadmap; until it ships, the trust score is a strong prior, not a verdict.

Sample size: 202 of 2,703 GitHub-backed servers (~7.5% of the GitHub-linked registry). Selection: random shuffle of the registry, no stratification by stars or recency. The 98 unfetched repos are a separate signal — they're servers the registry trusts enough to publish but whose source code isn't actually accessible. That's its own quality issue, just outside the scope of this analysis.

Methodology

Discovery: Hit https://registry.modelcontextprotocol.io/v0/servers with cursor-based pagination across 101 pages. 10,100 total servers, 2,703 unique GitHub-backed (the rest are remote-only HTTPS endpoints).

Sampling: Random shuffle of the 2,703, take the first 300 not already in our score cache.

Scoring: every server ran through the production mcpskills.io engine — same 15-signal algorithm available at mcpskills.io. Skills Mode auto-detected via MCP keywords + server.json presence. The known_vulnerabilities signal queries OSV.dev (unified GHSA + npm + PyPA + Go + RustSec), CISA KEV (actively-exploited vulnerabilities), and FIRST.org EPSS (30-day exploit probability) for any package.json discovered in the repo.

Full algorithm: /methodology.

Companion report: State of ClawHub Trust — April 2026.

Data sources

Every score in this report is reproducible from public data. The trust algorithm itself is an opinionated combination, but the inputs are not.

Prior research that motivated this work

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